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In the current preregistered fMRI study, we investigated the relationship between religi-
osity and behavioral and neural mechanisms of conflict processing, as a conceptual
replication of the study by Inzlicht et al., (2009). Participants (N ¼ 193) performed a gender-
Stroop task and afterwards completed standardized measures to assess their religiosity. As
expected, the task induced cognitive conflict at the behavioral level and at a neural level
this was reflected in increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). However,
individual differences in religiosity were not related to performance on the Stroop task as
measured in accuracy and interference effects, nor to neural markers of response conflict
(correct responses vs. errors) or informational conflict (congruent vs. incongruent stimuli).
Overall, we obtained moderate to strong evidence in favor of the null hypotheses that
religiosity is unrelated to cognitive conflict sensitivity. We discuss the implications for the
neuroscience of religion and emphasize the importance of designing studies that more
directly implicate religious concepts and behaviors in an ecologically valid manner.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Everywhere across the world, in all times and cultures we find
people who believe in supernatural beings. Religious beliefs
seem highly successful in offering explanations for various
phenomena, ranging from how the world originated, to why
one had to switch jobs and what happens after one dies. Yet
these beliefs are difficult - if not impossible - to support with
empirical evidence. In fact, believers are often confronted
with widely supported contradicting evidence, for instancegmail.com (S. Hoogeveen)
by Elsevier Ltd. This is
).evolutionary explanations of the origins of life or reduction-
istic explanations of their religious experiences. And yet,
despite these challenges, most religious believers keep up
their faith (Pew Research Center, 2012).
Various scholars have suggested that a mechanism of
reduced conflict sensitivity, i.e., detecting the incongruency
between two potentially conflicting sources of information,
may foster the acceptance and maintenance of religious be-
liefs. For example, dual-process accounts of religion (Risen,
2016), the predictive processing model (van Elk & Aleman,
2017), and the cognitive resource depletion model (Schjoedt, lukassnoek@gmail.com (L. Snoek), m.vanelk@uva.nl (M. van Elk).
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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reduced tendency for analytical thinking and error
monitoring.
Where the dual-process model by Risen (2016) assumes a
conflict between intuitive and analytical thinking that is
resolved by acquiescing to the intuition, the predictive pro-
cessing model by van Elk and Aleman (2017) assumes a con-
flict between prior beliefs and sensory input that is resolved by
assigningmoreweight to priors and suppressing the influence
of error signals (and hence mitigating the update of prior be-
liefs). The cognitive resource depletion model applies the
notion of reduced error monitoring specifically to collective
religious rituals. According to the model, the combination of a
charismatic authority, a high arousal context, and a sequence
of causally opaque ritualized behaviors creates optimal cir-
cumstances to facilitate a preordained (religious) interpreta-
tion of events and reduces the likelihood for idiosyncratic
(potentially non-religious) interpretations. These subtle dif-
ferences seem to predominantly reflect ‘a tale of different
literatures’, possibly due to the fact that the frameworks
originate fromdifferent disciplines; dual-processmodelswere
developed in social psychology, predictive processing in
(cognitive) neuroscience, and the cognitive resource depletion
model stems from anthropological research. Nevertheless, all
three accounts converge on the key idea that a process of
reduced conflict detection (or correction) makes individuals
less prone to note information that seemingly contradicts
their religious worldviews and to update their beliefs in the
light of new information. This mechanism could potentially
underlie the relative immunity of religious beliefs to criticism
based on empirical observations (cf. what Van Leeuwen, 2014
calls ‘evidential invulnerability’).
Notably, the implicit assumption of most theoretical
frameworks appears to be that a mechanism of reduced
conflict sensitivity makes people more receptive to being
religious. However, it could also be that being religious affects
people's sensitivity to conflicting information; religious
‘training’ inoculates believers against contradictions and vi-
olations of their worldview. This notion parallels findings
from mindfulness meditation research reporting evidence
that meditation training increases cognitive control as it
teaches practitioners to suppress irrelevant information
(Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2012), with
meditation experts showing less activation in brain areas
implicated in attention and cognitive control (e.g., the anterior
cingulate cortex; Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson,
&Davidson, 2007). As such,mindfulnessmeditationmay train
practitioners to flexibly suppress irrelevant information e
resulting in increased cognitive control. A similar process
may be at play in religious training, in which people also
engage in mental practices to maintain attention (e.g., medi-
tative prayer) and to inhibit irrelevant (e.g., sinful) thoughts.
On the other hand, naturalness of religion accounts posit that
religious concepts (e.g., mind-body dualism, supernatural
agents) are highly intuitive and that it is in fact non-religiosity
that requires cognitive effort to suppress or reject these in-
tuitions (Barrett, 2000; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2008; Norenzayan&
Gervais, 2013). This implies that ‘secular training’ (e.g., ana-
lytic thinking and scientific reasoning), rather than religious
training, involves suppressing intuitive information andenhancing the salience of analytic alternatives e resulting in
increased cognitive control for non-religious compared to
religious individuals.
In line with this latter suggestion, several empirical studies
found that increased religiosity is related to a decreased
cognitive performance, especially when a logically correct
responsemust override a conflicting intuitive response (e.g., in
a base-rate fallacy test; Daws & Hampshire, 2017; Good,
Inzlicht, & Larson, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2014; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, Zmigrod, & Robbins,
2019). Other behavioral studies correlated individuals’ self-
reported level of religiosity with their performance on low-
level cognitive control tasks such as the Go/No-go task or the
Stroop task. These studies present a mixed bag of evidence;
some report a positive relationship (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh,
and Nash (2009)), an inconsistent pattern (Inzlicht & Tullett,
2010), or no relationship (Kossowska, Szwed, Wronka,
Czarnek, & Wyczesany, 2016) between religiosity and cogni-
tive control (in terms of accuracy and reaction times).
In addition to this behavioral research, a fewneuroscientific
studies have been conducted on the association between reli-
giosity and conflict sensitivity. For instance, an fMRI study
investigated brain responses in devoted religious believerswho
listened to intercessory prayer. When participants believed
that the prayer was pronounced by a charismatic religious
authority, they showed a reduced activation of their frontal
executive network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPC) and the ACC, which have been associated with conflict
detection (Schjoedt, Stødkilde-Jørgensen, Geertz, Lund, &
Roepstorff, 2011). Furthermore, Inzlicht et al. (2009) conduct-
ed a series of EEG studies looking at the relation between reli-
giosity and the error-related negativity (ERN; Inzlicht et al.,
2009; Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010). Compared to skeptics, religious
believers demonstrated a smaller ERNamplitude in response to
errors on a color-word Stroop task (Inzlicht et al., 2009). The
authors suggest that these findings reflect the palliative effects
of religiosity on distress responses: religious believers experi-
ence less distress in association with committing an error and
this is reflected in a reduced ERN amplitude. There is, however,
an open-ended debate on the functional significance of the
ERN; while some researchers interpret the ERN primarily as an
affective (i.e., distress) signal, others emphasize that it mainly
reflects conflict-sensitivity (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Carter et al., 1998;
Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005; Maier & Steinhauser,
2016; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004).
Relatedly, different views have been proposed on how the
relation between religiosity and ACC conflict activity should
be interpreted; whereas Inzlicht, Tullett, and Good (2011)
suggest that ACC activity in this context reflects error
distress, Schjoedt and Bulbulia (2011) argue that the inter-
pretation of ACC activity as reflecting purely cognitive conflict
sensitivity is more parsimonious. We believe this discussion
partly hinges upon the operationalisation of ‘conflict’. EEG
studies on cognitive conflict have typically studied the ERN as
a proxy for ACC activity. The ERN is an error-related signal and
reflects neural activity associated with incorrect vs. correct
responses, i.e., conflict at the level of the behavioral response
(hereafter: response conflict). In contrast, fMRI studies on
cognitive conflict typically focus on the neural activity
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conflict at the level of information processing (hereafter:
informational conflict). Although there is often a correlation
between response conflict1 and informational conflict, not all
incongruent trials result in errors, nor do all congruent trials
by definition result in correct responses. It is therefore
important to dissociate between these two levels of conflict
and their associated neural activity (cf. Tang, Critchley, Glaser,
Dolan, & Butterworth, 2006; van Veen & Carter, 2005).
It thus remains unclear to what extent religiosity is related
to a reduced sensitivity for response conflict (e.g., responding
with ‘green’ when it should have been ‘red’) or to a reduced
sensitivity for informational conflict (e.g., seeing the word
‘green’ printed in a red font). An effect for response conflict
should be reflected in a relationship between religiosity and
the strength of the errorecorrect Stroop contrast in the fMRI
data, which would be a direct replication of the study by
Inzlicht et al. (2009) and their proposed framework (Inzlicht
et al., 2011; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). An ef-
fect for informational conflict should be reflected in a relation-
ship between religiosity and the strength of the
incongruentecongruent Stroop contrast in the fMRI data.
Schjoedt and Bulbulia (2011), for instance, indeed seem to
interpret Inzlicht et al.’s results as religious believers' inat-
tention to conflictmonitoring. In everyday life, both sources of
conflict detection could play a role in the maintenance of
religious beliefs, e.g., when a believer simply does not detect
the incongruency between different sources of information or
when he/she fails to suppress an intuitive but objectively
incorrect answer.
Taking the distinction between response conflict and
informational conflict into account, here we investigated two
different hypotheses regarding the relation between religi-
osity and cognitive conflict sensitivity: (1) there is a negative
relationship between religiosity and ACC activity induced by
response conflict (i.e., the incorrectecorrect response
contrast), and (2) there is a negative relationship between
religiosity and ACC activity induced by informational conflict
(i.e., the incongruentecongruent Stroop contrast). We note
that both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, as religiosity
could be related to both mechanisms of conflict detection.2
Although earlier studies provide preliminary evidence for
the religiosityeconflict sensitivity relation, we believe the
present study eincluding a conceptual replication of the
seminal study by Inzlicht et al. (2009)e is important for the
following reasons. First, in order to substantiate the notion
that religious believers are characterized by a general tendency
for reduced conflict sensitivity at the neural level, a significant
correlation or inter-group difference should be established. So1 Response conflict is here defined as the conflict between the
actual and the correct response, rather than the prepotent and
the correct response.
2 Based on the aforementioned theories addressing believers'
failure to notice incompatibility between different sources of
contradicting information, we would primarily expect a negative
association between religiosity and informational conflict (rather
than response conflict). However, from an empirical perspective,
our study most closely resembles the design by Inzlicht et al.
(2009), who measured and obtained support for a relation be-
tween religiosity and neural markers of response conflict.far, only three studies found evidence for an inverse relation
between religious beliefs and conflict-induced ACC activity;
Inzlicht et al. (2009) showed that religious zeal and belief in
God were associated with a reduced ERN response and
Kossowska et al. (2016) similarly found that religious funda-
mentalismwas related to a reducedN2 response on the Stroop
task, albeit only in the uncertainty condition where partici-
pants performed the task under undefined time pressure.
Another study failed to find a correlation between neuro-
physiologicalmeasures and religiosity (though the authors did
find an experimental effect of priming God's forgiving nature
on the ERN; Good et al., 2015). Second, with the exception of
Good et al. (2015, n ¼ 108), all experiments linking religiosity to
ACC activity included small samples and were therefore most
likely underpowered (i.e., Inzlicht et al., 2009, n ¼ 28 [Study 1],
n ¼ 22 [Study 2]; Kossowska et al., 2016, n ¼ 37) Third, the
hypothesized relation between religiosity and cognitive con-
flict is primarily based on either behavioral or EEG data. EEG
studies, however, can offer only indirect evidence for the
involvement of specific brain areas (Gazzaniga & Ivry, 2013).
The use of fMRI may complement the existing findings, as
fMRI allows for a higher spatial specificity, and may thus
provide more conclusive evidence regarding the role of the
ACC in the acceptance and maintenance of religious beliefs.
Finally, the current study design allowed us to dissociate be-
tween neural effects related to response conflict (i.e., activity
predicted by response accuracy) and to informational conflict
(i.e., activity predicted by Stroop congruency). This may help
to disentangle the ‘conflict sensitivity’ accounts of religiosity,
and hence affords a more precise theoretical interpretation of
the existing data.
1.1. Hypotheses
We tested eight hypotheses, four of which were based on our
research questions and four that served as ‘outcome neutral
tests’ (Chambers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, & Etchells,
2014). The four outcome neutral tests were used to validate
that our task did indeed induce cognitive conflict (reflected in
accuracy and Stroop interference effects), that error com-
mission was reflected in ACC activity, and that informational
conflict was reflected in ACC activity. The corresponding
outcome neutral hypotheses for the behavioral measures
were: (H1) participants are more accurate on congruent
compared to incongruent Stroop trials, and (H2) participants
respond faster on congruent compared to incongruent Stroop
trials. Outcome neutral hypotheses for the neural measures
were: (H3) errors on the Stroop task induce more ACC activity
compared to correct responses, on average across subjects,
and (H4) incongruent Stroop trials induce more ACC activity
compared to congruent trials, on average across subjects.
Conditional on establishing the effects related to hypoth-
eses 1e4, we tested four corresponding hypotheses about the
relation between religiosity and conflict sensitivity. For the
behavioral measures, we hypothesized that (H5) Stroop ac-
curacy is negatively related to religiosity, and (H6) Stroop
interference (i.e., the difference in RT for incongruent vs.
congruent trials) is positively related to religiosity, indicating
decreased cognitive performance. We note that, based on the
existing literature one could hypothesize both a positive and a
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tion; on the one hand, religiosity is associated with reduced
response conflict and hence smaller interference effects (cf.
Inzlicht et al., 2011). On the other hand, religiosity is associ-
ated with an increased tendency for intuitive responding,
which means that more effort is required to overcome these
intuitive response on incongruent Stroop trials, hence larger
interference effects should be expected (cf. Pennycook et al.,
2014). Despite these divergent theoretical predictions, most
studies have not found any association between religiosity
and Stroop interference (Inzlicht et al., 2009, Study 1; Inzlicht
& Tullett, 2010; Kossowska et al., 2016), except for Study 2 by
Inzlicht et al. (2009), in which a positive correlation between
religiosity and Stroop interference was reported. Here, in line
with the latter findingwe hypothesized a positive relationship
between religiosity and Stroop interference.
For the neural measures, we hypothesized that (H7) the
size of the errorecorrect response BOLD signal contrast (i.e.,
difference in BOLD signal between errors and correct re-
sponses) in the ACC is negatively related to religiosity, on
average across subjects (cf. Inzlicht et al., 2009), and (H8) the
size of the incongruentecongruent BOLD signal contrast (i.e.,
difference in BOLD signal between the incongruent and
congruent condition) in the ACC is negatively related to reli-
giosity, on average across subjects. All hypotheses were pre-
registered on the Open Science Framework (see https://osf.io/
nspxb/registrations). Finally, we added exploratory whole-
brain analyses to explore whether religiosity is associated
with conflict-induced neural activity in any other brain areas
besides the ACC.2. Methods
2.1. Reporting
We report how we determined our sample size, all data ex-
clusions (if any), all inclusion/exclusion criteria, whether in-
clusion/exclusion criteria were established prior to data
analysis, all manipulations, and all measures in the study.
2.2. Overview
The data for this study had already been collected as part of
the Population Imaging (PIoP) project (May 2015 - April 2016),
conducted at the Spinoza Center for Neuroimaging at the
University of Amsterdam (see Appendix A for a description of
the project). An overview of the data collection and analysis
procedure is presented in Fig. 1. All hypotheses were formu-
lated independently without any knowledge of the pre-
processed data, and the analysis pipeline was developed and
preregistered prior to data inspection.3 The preregistration
can be accessed on the OSF (https://osf.io/nspxb/). This folder
also contains the script for the Stroop task, the anonymized
raw and processed data and the R scripts used to preprocess3 Specifically, LS was involved in data collection and (pre)pro-
cessing the MRI data and has no access to the religiosity data.
MvE and SH formulated the research questions and hypotheses
without any access to the MRI data.the behavioral data and to conduct the confirmatory analyses
(including all figures). The preprocessing scripts for the fMRI
analysis and the exploratory fMRI analyses can be found at
https://github.com/lukassnoek/ReligiosityFMRI. The (uncor-
rected) brain maps can be found at https://neurovault.org/
collections/6139/.
2.3. Participants
Participants were students who were recruited at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam and received a financial remunera-
tion. Participants were screened for MRI contraindications
before MRI data acquisition. The intended number of par-
ticipants was 250, but due to technical problems during part
of the acquisition process, only 244 participants yielded
useable MRI data. Of those 244, data from 20 subjects were
excluded due to artifacts in the MRI data due to scanner
instabilities or errors during export and/or reconstruction of
the data. Additionally, 10 participants were excluded
because they did not complete the task of interest (i.e., the
gender-Stroop task). These exclusions were known at the
time of the preregistration.
We entered the analysis phase with data from N ¼ 214
participants. Out of these 214, eight participants were
excluded eas preregisterede because they did not com-
plete the religiosity questionnaire or lacked data on the
covariates of interest (age, gender, and intelligence). We
additionally preregistered to exclude participants whose
accuracy was lower than 65%, because this indicates
performance at chance level. This means that partici-
pants who responded correctly on fewer than 63 out of
the 96 trials were excluded. Furthermore, participants
who did not respond within the response interval on
more than 20% of the Stroop trials were also excluded. As
the minimum response interval of 4500 ms is assumed to
be sufficient for timely responses, missed responses on
more than 20% of the trials were taken to indicate that
participants did not understand or perform the task
adequately. These criteria led to the exclusion of 14
participants, yielding a total sample size of 193. In addi-
tion, for the fMRI analyses, there were 21 participants
who did not make any mistake during the task, pre-
venting us from calculating the ‘incorrectecorrect’
contrast.4 As such, the confirmatory ROI and whole-brain
analyses of this contrast were based on data from 172
participants. All other analyses were done on a total of
N ¼ 193 participants with complete data. The final sample
consisted of 109 ð56:5%Þ women and 84 ð43:5%Þ men. The
average age of the participants was 22.2 years (SD ¼ 1:9;
range ¼ 18 26).
The study was approved by the local ethics committee at
the Psychology Department of the University of Amsterdam
(Project #2015-EXT-4366) and all participants were treated in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.4 Of the 21 excluded participants, 19 made no errors and 2
participants made 1 error, but no reliable signal could be
extracted for this error trial.
Fig. 1 e Overview of data acquisition and analysis. Boxes marked in grey had already been completed prior to commencing
this project. Boxed marked in black represent the analysis steps for the present study, which were determined in the
preregistation.
6 The face Stroop task - instead of the regular word-color
variant - was chosen because it offers optimal opportunities for
dissociating between perceptual processing of target and dis-
tractor dimensions, as processing of the distractor faces can
straightforwardly be linked to activation patterns in the fusiform
face area (FFA; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). In the current study, how-
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The sample size was determined based on the target of the
overall project minus exclusions due to artifacts in the data,
incomplete data, or preregistered quality criteria. As there
were no existing fMRI studies on the relation between religi-
osity and cognitive conflict processing eonly EEG studiesewe
could not perform a power analysis. However, we note that a
sample of Nz200 is substantially large for an fMRI study
(Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017)5 and exceeds the recommended
minimum sample size of N ¼ 100 for correlational (neuro-
imaging) research (Dubois & Adolphs, 2016; Sch€onbrodt &
Perugini, 2013).
2.4. Procedure
The study ran fromMay 2015 until April 2016. On each testing
day, two participants were tested, which took approximately
4 h and included an extensive behavioral test battery
(approximately 2.5 h) and an MRI session (approximately
1.5 h). Participants received a financial remuneration of 50
euros. The order of behavioral and MRI sessions were coun-
terbalanced across participants.
2.5. Study design
The study involved a mixed design with Stroop congruency as
the within-subjects variable and religiosity as the between-
subjects continuous individual differences variable. The
main part of the study qualified as an observational study; we
investigated the correlation between performance on the
Stroop task and religiosity, and between BOLD-fMRI activity
and religiosity, without manipulating any variables except for
trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent Stroop trials). The
fMRI task involved a rapid event-related design; a hypothe-
sized BOLD responsewasmodelled following the presentation5 This meta-analysis reports a median sample size of approxi-
mately 22 for fMRI studies.of facial stimuli in the congruent or incongruent condition, as
well as following correct and incorrect responses.
2.6. Stroop task
We used a face-gender variant of the Stroop task (adapted
from Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010), often referred to as the
‘gender-Stroop’ task, in which pictures of faces from either
gender are paired with the corresponding (i.e., congruent) or
opposite (i.e., incongruent) gender label (see below for details
on the task and example pictures of the stimuli). The face-
gender variant of the Stroop task (Egner & Hirsch, 2005) has
been shown to induce significant behavioral conflict and
neural ACC activation (Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008).6
Each trial consisted of a photographic stimulus depicting
either a male or female face, with the gender label ‘MAN’ or
‘WOMAN’ superimposed in red, resulting in gender-congruent
and gender-incongruent stimuli (see Fig. 2). The Stroop con-
dition econgruent vs. incongruente thus formed the within-
subjects manipulated variable.
The stimuli set consisted of a total of 12 female and 12male
faces, with the labels ‘man’, ‘sir’,‘woman’, and ‘lady’, both in
lower- and uppercase added to the pictures (e.g., ‘sir’ and
‘SIR’).7 All combinations appeared exactly one time, resulting
in 96 unique trials (48 congruent and 48 incongruent). Partic-
ipants were always instructed to respond to the gender of the
pictured face, ignoring the distractor word.ever, we were mainly interested in the cognitive conflict aspect
rather than perceptual processing, and therefore solely focused
on activation in the ACC.
7 The Dutch labels were ‘man’, ‘heer’,‘vrouw’, and ‘dame’,
respectively.
Table 1 e Items of the religiosity scale.
1. To what extent do you consider yourself to be religious?
2. To what extent do you believe in God or a supernatural being?
3. To what extent do you believe in life after death?
4. My faith is important to me.
5. My faith affects my thinking and practice in daily life.
6. I pray daily.
7. I visit a church or religious meeting on a weekly basis.
Note.All itemsweremeasured on a 5-point scale ranging from not at
all to very much.
Fig. 2 e Stimuli as used in the face-gender Stroop task.
Distracter words could be incongruent (left) and congruent
(right) with the target face. NB. Translations of the Dutch
labels: ‘MAN’ ¼ ‘MAN’ and ‘VROUW’ ¼ ‘WOMAN’.
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inter-trial interval ranging between 4000 and 6000 ms, in
steps of 500 ms. Participants could respond from the begin-
ning of the stimulus presentation until the end of the inter-
trial interval (i.e., minimum response interval was 4500,
maximum response interval was 6500), using their left and
right index finger. If no button was pressed during this in-
terval, the trial was recorded as a ‘miss’. Stimuli were pre-
sented using Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, www.
neurobs.com), and displayed on a back-projection screen
that was viewed by the subjects via a mirror attached to the
head coil.
2.7. Religiosity measures
Our religiosity measure consisted of 7 items that were based
on religiosity questions included in the World Values Survey
(WVS; World Values Survey, 2010), covering religious iden-
tification, beliefs, values, and behaviors (institutionalized
such as church attendance and private such as prayer). Be-
sides having high face-validity, these measures have been
validated in other studies (Lindeman, Svedholm-Hakkinen,
& Lipsanen, 2015; Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski,
2012; Stavrova, 2015) and the items have been used in pre-
vious studies (Maij et al., 2017; van Elk & Snoek, 2020). The
items were evaluated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
not at all to very much; see Table 1 for the exact items. Ratings
on the seven religiosity items were tallied to create an
average religiosity score per participant (M ¼ 1:74; SD ¼
0:84). Cronbach's alpha for the 7-item religiosity scale was
.89, indicating good internal consistency. For the analyses,
these average scores were standardized. As anticipated in
the preregistration, the distribution of the religiosity data
was indeed positively-skewed, since our sample consisted of
highly secular students. Although non-normality may
reduce statistical power (Poldrack, Mumford, & Nichols,
2011), it does not pose a problem for our analysis, since
Bayesian linear regression models elike general (ized) linear
models in generale do not assume normality of predictors
(solely of model residuals).2.8. Additional variables
Gender, age, and intelligence were included as covariates in
the analyses of the main hypotheses. Intelligence was
indexed by the sum score on the 36 item version (set II) of
Raven's Advances Progressive Matrices Test (Raven, 2000;
Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). The rationale for including
these measures as covariates in our analysis was to control
for the potential confound that any religiosity effect may be
driven by other individual differences that are known to be
associated with religiosity; females are typically more reli-
gious thanmales (Miller&Hoffmann, 1995), older people tend
to be more religious than younger people (Argue, Johnson, &
White, 1999), and people scoring high on intelligence are on
average less religious (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013).
Age and intelligence scores were standardized in the
analyses.
Since the proposed study was part of a larger project, a
number of extra tasks and questionnaires were administered
to the participants (see Appendix A for a description). These
measures were not included in the present study.
2.9. fMRI data acquisition
Subjects were tested using a Philips Achieva 3T MRI scanner
and a 32-channel SENSE headcoil. A survey scan wasmade for
spatial planning of the subsequent scans. After the survey
scan, five functional (T2*-weighted BOLD-fMRI) scans (corre-
sponding to five different tasks, including the gender-Stroop
task; see Appendix A for an overview of the other tasks), one
structural (T1-weighted) scan, and one diffusion-weighted
(DWI) scan were acquired. The DWI scan will not be
described further, as it is not relevant to the current study. The
Stroop task was done during the second scan of the session
(not including the survey scan).
The structural T1-weighted scan was acquired using 3D
fast field echo (TR: 82 ms, TE: 38 ms, flip angle: 8, FOV: 240 
18 mm, 220 slices acquired using single-shot ascending slice
order and a voxel size of 1:0  1:0  1:0 mm). The func-
tional T2*-weighted gradient echo sequences (single shot,
echo planar imaging) were run. The following parameters
were used for the MRI sequence during the gender-Stroop
task: TR¼ 2000ms, TE¼ 27.63ms, flip angle: 76:1, FOV: 240 
240 mm, in-plane resolution 64  64, 37 slices (with
ascending slice acquisition), slice thickness 3 mm, slice gap
.3 mm, voxel size 3  3  3 mm), covering the entire brain.
During the Stroop task, 245 volumes were acquired.
8 We note that the current design was suboptimal in estimating
the effect of informational conflict (but not response conflict) in
the fMRI data. Due to insufficient ‘jittering’ of the interstimulus
interval, the first-level predictors for congruent and incongruent
trails were strongly negatively corrected (r ¼  0:9). While this
does not bias our results (the generalized least squares estimator
we used is still unbiased), it does increase the variance of our first-
level results, which in turn reduces the power of finding a cor-
relation of religiosity with the first-level effect of informational
conflict (operationalized by the ‘incongruent-congruent’
contrast). This issue only applies to the ‘incongruent-congruent’
contrast, not the ‘incorrect-correct’ contrast (as these predictors
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Preprocessing was performed using fmriprep version 1.0.15
(Esteban et al., 2019, 2018), a Nipype (Gorgolewski et al., 2011,
2017) based tool. fmriprep was run using the package's Docker
interface. Each T1w (T1-weighted) volume was corrected for
INU (intensity non-uniformity) using N4BiasFieldCorrection
v2.1.0 (Tustison et al., 2010) and skull-stripped using ants-
BrainExtraction.sh v2.1.0 (using the OASIS template). Brain
surfaces were reconstructed using recon-all from FreeSurfer
v6.0.1 (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999), and the brain mask esti-
mated previously was refined with a custom variation of the
method to reconcile ANTs-derived and FreeSurfer-derived
segmentations of the cortical gray-matter of Mindboggle
(Klein et al., 2017). Spatial normalization to the ICBM 152
Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version 2009c (Fonov,
Evans, McKinstry, Almli, & Collins, 2009) was performed
through nonlinear registration with the antsRegistration tool
of ANTs v2.1.0 (Avants, Epstein, Grossman,& Gee, 2008), using
brain-extracted versions of both T1w volume and template.
Brain tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-
matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was performed on the
brain-extracted T1w using fast (Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001;
FSL v5.0.9).
Functional data was motion corrected using mcflirt
(Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002; FSL v5.0.9).
‘Fieldmap-less’ distortion correction was performed by co-
registering the functional image to the same-subject T1w
image with intensity inverted (Huntenburg, 2014; Wang et al.,
2017) constrained with an average fieldmap template (Treiber
et al., 2016), implemented with antsRegistration (ANTs). This
was followed by co-registration to the corresponding T1w
using boundary-based registration (Greve & Fischl, 2009) with
9 degrees of freedom, using bbregister (FreeSurfer v6.0.1).
Motion correcting transformations, field distortion correcting
warp, BOLD-to-T1w transformation and T1w-to-template
(MNI) warp were concatenated and applied in a single step
using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs v2.1.0) using Lanczos
interpolation. Functional data was smoothed with a 5 mm
FWHMGaussian kernel. Many internal operations of fmriprep
use Nilearn (Abraham et al., 2014), principally within the
BOLD-processing workflow. For more details of the pipeline
see http://fmriprep.readthedocs.io.
2.10.1. Quality control
After preprocessing, the MRIQC package (Esteban et al., 2017)
was used to generate visual reports of the data and results of
several intermediate preprocessing steps. These reports were
visually checked for image artifacts, such as ghosting, exces-
sive motion, and reconstruction errors. Participants display-
ing such issues were excluded from further analysis.
2.10.2. fMRI first-level model
The fMRI timeseries were modelled using a first level (i.e.,
subject-specific) GLM, using the implementation provided by
the nistats Python package (https://nistats.github.io;
Abraham et al., 2014; version rel0.0.1b). The GLM included four
predictors modelling elements of the task: incongruent trials,
congruent trials, correct trials, and incorrect trials. If aparticipant did not make any mistakes, the ‘incorrect trials’
predictor was left out. The predictors were convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF; Glover,
1999). Onsets for the (in)congruent trial predictors were
defined at the onset of the image and had a fixed duration of
.5 s. Onsets for the (in)correct trial predictors were defined at
the onset of the response. Additionally, six motion regressors
(reflecting the translation and rotation parameters in three
dimensions) were included as covariates. GLMs were fit with
AR1 autocorrelation correction. After fitting the GLMs, the
following contrasts were computed: ‘incorrectecorrect’ and
‘incongruentecongruent’. The parameters ebeta parame-
terse and associated variance terms from these contrasts
were used in subsequent confirmatory ROI analyses and
exploratory whole-brain analyses.8
2.10.3. fMRI group-level model (exploratory)
In addition to the confirmatory analyses, we also performed
an exploratory whole-brain analysis of the effect of religiosity
on fMRI activity associated with response conflict (i.e,. H7)
and informational conflict (i.e., H8). Similar to the confirma-
tory analyses, in addition to religiosity, the variables age,
gender, and intelligence were added as covariates to the
model. In the group-level model and in accordance with the
‘summary statistics approach’, the first-level ‘incor-
rectecorrect’ and ‘incongruentecongruent’ contrast esti-
mates represent the dependent variables, while religiosity,
age, gender, and intelligence represent the independent
variables. For the participants who did not make any error,
we could not compute the ‘incorrect-correct’ contrast and
they were thus excluded from the group-analysis of the
‘incorrect-correct’ contrast.
We used the FSL tool randomise (Winkler, Ridgway,
Webster, Smith, & Nichols, 2014) in combination with
threshold-free cluster enhancement (Smith & Nichols, 2009)
to perform a non-parametric group-analysis of the effect of
religiosity. We ran 10; 000 permutations. Specifically, we
tested for a non-directional (two-tailed) effect of religiosity
variable (controlled for the other covariates). In addition, as
‘outcome neutral tests’, we computed the average of the first-
level contrasts (‘intercept-only’ model) for both the ‘incor-
rect-correct’ and ‘incongruent-congruent’ first-level con-
trasts. We corrected for multiple comparisons using the
distribution of the ‘maximum statistic’ under the null-
hypothesis (i.e., the default in randomise) with a voxel-level
a value of .025 (i.e., a ¼ 0:05 but corrected for two-sided
tests; Chen et al., 2018). We plotted the significant voxelsare much less correlated with each other, r ¼  0:2).
Fig. 3 e ROIs used for our confirmatory ROI analyses of the
effect of religiosity on response conflict and informational
conflict.
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standard MNI152 brain.
2.11. ROI definition
For this study's confirmatory ROI analyses, we used a pre-
registered ROI based on a conjunction of a functional ROI,
derived from fMRI activity preferentially associated with
‘error’ (for H3 and H7) or ‘conflict’ (for H4 and H8) extracted
using Neurosynth (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, &
Wager, 2011), and an anatomical ROI based on the
anatomical coordinates of the ACC, taken from the
HarvardeOxford cortical atlas (Craddock, James,
Holtzheimer, Hu, & Mayberg, 2012). The reasons for using
a mask based on both a functional and anatomical ROI are
twofold. First, the anatomical ROI of the ACC in the
HarvardeOxford atlas (and many others) consists of several
putatively functionally different subregions (Gasquoine,
2013; Holroyd et al., 2004; Vogt, 2005). A functional ROI
based on the Neurosynth database would resolve this issue
of functional ambiguity within a single (anatomical) ROI;
however, the Neurosynth maps for ‘error’ and ‘conflict’
contain more brain areas than just the ACC (such as the
bilateral insula). Therefore, by using the conjunction be-
tween the functional ROIs based on Neurosynth and the
anatomical ROI of the ACC, we restrict our analyses to a
single anatomical region that is most likely to be functionally
relevant for the psychological constructs of interest, i.e.,
response conflict (“error”) and informational conflict (“con-
flict”). We realize that due to the ambiguity of the term
‘conflict’ (which may refer to informational conflict or
response conflict), the Neurosynth map for ‘conflict’ will
likely also be based on studies involving response conflict.
Although not ideal, we believe that this method is the most
appropriate way to define our ROI.
Specifically, for our functional ROI, we used the Neuro-
synth Python package to conduct separate meta-analyses of
the terms “error*” and “conflict*”, with a frequency
threshold of .0019. We used the ‘association test map’ from
the meta-analysis output (FDR-thresholded for multiple
comparisons at p< 0:01), which reflects voxels which are
preferentially associated with the term ‘error’ and ‘conflict’,
rather than other psychological constructs. For our
anatomical ROI, we used the ‘anterior cingulate cortex’ re-
gion within the HarvardeOxford cortical atlas. We will
define the ACC within this probabilistic atlas as the set of
voxels with a nonzero probability of belonging to the ACC.
Our final ROI is based on the logical conjunction of these
two ROIs (see Fig. 3). For the confirmatory ROI analyses, we
averaged the GLM parameters (bb, ‘beta-values’) and associ-
ated variance parameters (var½bb) separately for the ‘incor-
rectecorrect’ (H3 and H7) and ‘incongruentecongruent’ (for
H4 and H8) first-level contrasts for each participant. These
ROI-average parameters were subsequently analyzed in a
hierarchical Bayesian regression model (see Statistical
Models section for details).9 These maps were generated on February 26th, 2019.2.12. Statistical models
We applied hierarchical Bayesian models for all hypotheses to
accommodate the hierarchical structure of the behavioral and
fMRI data, with trials nested within participants. In the
multilevel structure, we allow the overall performance and the
effect of condition to vary between participants, by including
random intercepts and random slopes, respectively. The
random intercepts and slopes are desirable theoretically; we
are interested in individual differences, hence we should allow
effects to differ between individuals. Statistically, omitting the
random slope has been shown to result in overestimation of
the crosselevel interaction term (i.e., the religiosity condition
effect) and the lower level main effect (i.e., the effect of con-
dition; Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). Finally, adopting this multi-
level structure decreases the influence of trial noise through
the process of hierarchical shrinkage (see Discussion; Rouder,
Kumar, & Haaf, 2019). We constructed the hierarchical
Bayesian models using the R package brms (Bürkner, 2017),
which relies on the programming language Stan (Carpenter
et al., 2017). This package incorporates bridgesampling
(Gronau, Singmann, & Wagenmakers, 2017) for hypothesis
testing by means of Bayes factors (BF) and posterior probabil-
ities. The general form of our multilevel regression models is:
yij  N









where yij is the outcome per trial per participant, and xij the
corresponding value of the predictor. The subscript i is for the
individual trials (i ¼ 1:::ntrials) and the subscript j is for the
participants (j ¼ 1:::N).
2.12.1. Prior specification
We note that the most relevant parameter for making in-
ferences in our specified models is the b1, i.e., the beta-weight
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dition, religiosity). As this parameter is used in the critical
tests for our hypotheses, it is important to set appropriate
priors particularly for this parameter. We chose b1  N ð0;1Þ
for the (standardized) predictors. This prior is listed as a rec-
ommended ‘generic weakly informative prior’ in the Stan
manual (Betancourt, Vehtari, & Gelman, 2015), and has been
used in this context before (e.g., Gelman, Lee, & Guo, 2015).
On the remaining parameters we used weakly-informative
priors, whereby the priors for the regression weights (b0s) are
derived from a normal distribution, and the priors on the scale
parameters from a half-Cauchy distribution (Cþ; Gelman,
2006): b0  N ð0; 10Þ for the fixed intercept; b0j  N ð0; t20Þ for
the varying part of the intercept per participant; b1j  N ð0; t21Þ
for the varying part of the predictor effect per participant; t 
Cþð0;2Þ for the participant-level variance. Finally, we used the
default LKJ-correlation prior to model the covariancematrices
in hierarchicalmodels (Lewandowski, Kurowicka,& Joe, 2009).
That is, we used Uk  LKJðzÞ, with Uk being the correlation
matrix and z set to 1.
2.12.2. Interpretation of evidence
Hypothesis testing was done by means of Bayes factors that
evaluate the extent to which the data is likely under the
alternative hypothesis (e.g.,H1eH8) versus the corresponding
null hypothesis H0. The Bayes factor (BF) reflects the change
from prior hypothesis or model probabilities to posterior hy-
pothesis or model probabilities and as such quantifies the











where M1eM8 and M0 represent the models specified for
H1eH8 and H0, respectively. The Bayes factor BF10 then rep-
resents the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of the observed
data under M1 and M0:
BF10 ¼pðdatajM1ÞpðdatajM0Þ (3)
As our hypotheses are directed, we computed order-
restricted Bayes factors, i.e., BFþ0 in case of an expected pos-
itive effect. Note that the subscripts on Bayes factor to refer to
the hypotheses being compared, with the first and second
subscript referring to the one-sided hypothesis of interest and
the null hypothesis, respectively. BFþ0 is used in case of a
hypothesized positive effect for the reference group or a
positive relation between variables; BF0 is used for a negative
effect for the reference group or a negative relation between
variables. As Bayes factors are fundamentally ratios that are
transitive in nature, we can easily compute an order restricted
Bayes factor; by (1) using the BF for the unrestricted model
versus the null model, and (2) comparing the unrestricted
model to an order restriction, we can then (3) use the resulting
BFs to evaluate the order restriction versus the null model
(Morey, 2015).
By default, prior model odds were assumed to be equal for
both models that are compared against each other. As the ev-
idence is quantified on a continuous scale, we also present theresults as such. Nevertheless, we included a verbal summary of
the results by means of the interpretation categories for Bayes
factors proposed by Lee andWagenmakers (2013, p. 105), based
on the original labels specified by Jeffreys (1939). In addition to
Bayes factors, we present the posteriormodel probabilities that
are derived from the generated posterior samples.
For all outcome neutral tests we preregistered that a Bayes
factor of at least 10 etheminimum value for strong evidencee
was required to meet the criteria.
We declare that all models that are described below were
constructed before the data were inspected. Additionally, all
analyses were run as preregistered. Any deviations are
explicitly mentioned in the manuscript.3. Results
3.1. Outcome neutral tests
3.1.1. Behavioral stroop effect e accuracy
A hierarchical logistic regression model with varying in-
tercepts for the participants and a varying slope for the effect
of Stroop congruency was constructed to model response ac-
curacy. In order to validate the presence of a congruency effect
on accuracy, i.e., a Stroop effect, we compared the model for
H0 containing only the varying intercept, to the model forH
containing the varying intercept and the negative effect of
congruency.H thus indicates that the incongruent condition
decreases the probability of responding correctly on the Stroop
task, relative to the congruent condition.
Results revealed a Bayes factor of 8:43 1011 in favor of
the alternative model (M) relative to the null model (M0).
That is, BF0 ¼ 8:43 1011, indicating that the data are about
1011 times more likely under the model assuming lower
accuracy for incongruent Stroop trials than for congruent
Stroop trials. In order words, the data provide strong evi-
dence for the Stroop effect indexed by accuracy (H1). See
Table 2 for a summary of the results of all four outcome
neutral tests.
3.1.2. Behavioral stroop effect e response times
We used a similar hierarchical regression model with varying
intercepts for the participants and a varying slope for the ef-
fect of Stroop condition to model reaction times. Note that
only correct trials are included in the RT analysis. To account
for the typical positive skew in RT data, we modelled reaction
times as an ex-Gaussian distribution, i.e., a mixture of a
Gaussian and an exponential distribution, which has been
shown to fit empirical RT data well (Balota & Spieler, 1999;
Balota & Yap, 2011; Whelan, 2008). This distribution is incor-
porated in the brms package, and thus only needed to be
specified. Here we expected RTs to be longer for incongruent
vs. congruent trials, hence the Bayes factor BFþ0 was calcu-
lated for ratio between the marginal likelihoods of the
observed data under Hþ versus H0. Again, we expected a
Bayes factor of at least 10.
We obtained a Bayes factor of 3:53 1067 in favor of Mþ,
that is BFþ0 ¼ 3:53 1067. In other words, we collected
strong evidence for the Stroop interference effect on reac-
tion times (H2).
Table 2 e Results outcome neutral tests.
Hypothesis Bayes factor Posterior Probability Estimated Coefficient
H1: accuracyincongr: <accuracycongr: 1011 1  :64 ½  :85;  :46
H2: RTincongr: > RTcongr: 1067 1 :03 ½:02; :03
H3: ACCincorr: > ACCcorr: ∞a 1 3:26 ½2:89;3:64
H4: ACCincongr: > ACCcongr: 157.7 .99 :15 ½:03; :26
Note.
a Estimated to approach ‘‘infinity’’ as all posterior sampleswere in accordancewith the order-restricted hypothesis. Bayes factors are the order-
restricted Bayes factors for the alternative hypothesis of interest; BF0 for H1 and BFþ0 for H2eH4. Posterior probabilities are the posterior
model probabilities of the alternative model versus the null model. Coefficients are the medians of the posterior distributions for the
parameter of interest (i.e., Stroop condition or response accuracy) with 95% credible intervals in square brackets.
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The hierarchical nature of the fMRI data ebeing derived from
multiple trialse was already taken into account in the calcu-
lation of the ‘incorrectecorrect’ contrast and the ‘incon-
gruentecongruent’ contrast in FSL: we exported the beta-
values for each contrast per participant, as well as the vari-
ance for the contrasts, i.e., bb and var½bb. The inclusion of the
variance parameter in the Bayesian models is important,
because it allows one to retain the uncertainty associatedwith
the activation level contrast, which is typically lost or ignored
when extracting fMRI data for ROI-analyses.10 In order to test
H3 that the average contrast of ACC activationethe average
‘intercept’ or bb e was substantially different from 0, we used
the function hypothesis which allows for directed hypothesis
test of the specified parameters.11 bb is calculated as (bbincorr: 
bbcorr:), therefore the hypothesis states that bb is larger than
0 (i.e., increased ACC activity for errors compared to correct
responses). Here we calculated the Bayes factor forHþ stating
that bb >0.
We note that analyses that took the ‘incorrectecorrect’
fMRI contrast as the dependent variable (H3 and H7) include
data from 172 participants rather than 193, since some par-
ticipants made no errors on the Stroop task.
The results showed evidence for the alternative hypothesis
to approach ‘‘infinity’’, that is BFþ0 ¼ ∞. Note that this Bayes
factor was estimated by testing the proportion of posterior
samples that satisfy the hypothesis that the intercept > 0.
When all posterior samples are in accordance with the hy-
pothesis, a Bayes factor of ‘‘infinity’’ can be obtained. In this
case that means that the Bayes factor is at least 60; 000 since
themodel included 60;000 samples. In otherwords, the neural
data provide strong evidence that the ACC is sensitive to
response accuracy on the Stroop task.10 The possibility to include the variance of the observations in
the regression model formula was added for the purpose of meta-
analyses (Vuorre, 2016). However, it also serves the current pur-
pose very well.
11 The term intercept may be somewhat confusing here. Since
the outcome variable is the contrast between the incongruent
and congruent condition (i.e., the difference), we only include the
intercept in this model, and hence look at the effect of the
parameter ‘intercept’.3.1.4. Neural processing e informational conflict
A similar procedure was used to test H4, this time with the
ACC activity contrast for Stroop congruency instead of
response outcomes. That is, a hierarchical regression model
with a varying intercept for the participants was constructed.
The Bayes factor was calculated for the hypothesis that bb is
larger than 0, sincewe expected bbincongr: to be larger than bbcongr:,
resulting in a positive contrast. Again, a Bayes factor of at least
10 was required to pass the outcome neutral criterion test.
A Bayes factor of 157.7 in favor of the alternative hypoth-
esis was obtained (i.e., BFþ0 ¼ 157:7), indicating that the data
provide strong evidence that the ACC is sensitive to infor-
mational conflict on the Stroop task.
The results of these four analyses indicate that all pre-
specified outcome neutral criteria were met.
3.2. Main preregistered analyses
3.2.1. Behavioral stroop effect and religiosity e accuracy
In order to test H5 whether self-reported religiosity of in-
dividuals is related to their performance on a conflict-
inducing Stroop task, an extended Bayesian hierarchical lo-
gistic regression model was constructed, by adding religiosity
as second-level predictor. Specifically, the model for H0
included varying intercepts and varying slopes for Stroop
condition (as before) per participant, plus the participant-level
variables gender, age, and intelligence (i.e., the covariates).
The model for the alternative hypothesis was identical plus
the inclusion of religiosity as an additional participant-level
predictor. Notably, an interaction term for religiosity  con-
gruency was also included, as the effect of religiosity might be
specific for performance in the conflict condition (i.e., the
incongruent Stroop condition). As we expected a negative
relation between religiosity and performance on the gender-
Stroop task, we restricted the coefficient for religiosity to be
negative in calculating the Bayes factor, i.e., we performed a
one-sided test.12 The ratio of marginal likelihoods for the data
under H versus H0, i.e., the Bayes factor, were calculated to
determine the evidence for the predictive value of religiosity
in explaining Stroop performance.12 The coefficient for the interaction term was not order-
restricted.
Fig. 4 e The marginal effect of religiosity on Stroop accuracy and response time, displayed per Stroop condition. The line
with the blue 95% credible interval band indicates performance on congruent Stroop trials, the line with the red 95% credible
interval band indicates performance on incongruent Stroop trials.
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BF0 ¼ 44:8), indicating that the data provided more support
for the null model than for the religiosity model. This result
qualifies as strong evidence that religiosity is not negatively
related to accuracy on the Stroop task. The posterior me-
dians and the 95% credible interval for the coefficients of
religiosity ( 0:08 ½  0:25; 0:09) and of religiosity  Stroop
condition (0:10 ½  0:04; 0:24) indicate that neither religi-
osity, nor the interaction between religiosity and Stroop
condition was related to performance on the Stroop task
(see also Fig. 4a). The results of all main hypotheses are also
summarized in Table 3. The parameters in the regression
models for the four main analyses are displayed in the Ap-
pendix (Figure B.7).
3.2.2. Behavioral stroop effect and religiosity e response
times
We constructed a similar model with RT as the dependent
variable; the model for H0 was a hierarchical ex-Gaussian
regression model for RT with varying intercepts and a vary-
ing slope for Stroop conditioneincluding participant gender,
age, and intelligence as covariates. For Hþ, the model was
identical with the added religiosity predictor and the religi-
osity  congruency interaction term. Again, we hypothesized
that religiosity would be negatively related to Stroop perfor-
mance, hence we expected a positive effect of religiosity on
Stroop response times.
A Bayes factor of 3:93 105 was obtained (i.e., BFþ0 ¼
3:93 105, BF0þ ¼ 25461). Similar to the accuracy analysis,
this indicates that the data do not provide support for the
hypothesis that religiosity is related to longer response times
on the Stroop task. Rather, we obtained strong evidence for
the null hypothesis. The posteriormedians for the coefficients
of religiosity (0:01 ½  0:01; 0:02) and of religiosity  Stroop
condition (0:00 ½  0:00; 0:01) corroborate that there was no
main effect of religiosity on response times, nor was there aninteraction of religiosity Stroop condition on response times
(see also Fig. 4b).
3.2.3. Neural processing and religiosity e response conflict
A Bayesian linear regression was performed in order to
test H7 whether self-reported religiosity is related to the
ACC sensitivity to incorrect vs. correct responses on the
Stroop task. The beta-values for the BOLD contrast in our
specified ROI served as the dependent variable, i.e., the
extracted bb’s. Again, the variance of the individual beta-
values was included to take the uncertainty of the
contrast estimation into account. Religiosity served as the
predictor of interest and gender, age, and intelligence were
added as covariates. That is, we compared the model
including the contrast-intercept and the covariates (H0) to
the model additionally including the religiosity predictor.
Based on the findings by Inzlicht et al. (2009), we expected
a negative relation between religiosity and ACC activity
induced by response conflict.
The results showed more evidence for the null model
than for the model including religiosity as a predictor:
BF0 ¼ 0:286 (i.e., BF0 ¼ 3:49). This Bayes factor is inter-
preted as moderate evidence against the hypothesis that
religiosity is associated with reduced ACC sensitivity to
response conflict in the Stroop task (i.e., the ‘incor-
rectecorrect’ contrast). The posterior median and credible
interval for the religiosity predictor were  0:09 ½  0:44;
0:26. The scatterplot in Fig. 5a illustrates the (absence of
an) association between religiosity and sensitivity of the
ACC to response conflict.3.2.4. Neural processing and religiosity e informational
conflict
The same model comparison was performed with regard to
the stimulus congruency contrast (i.e., H8). Here, we used the
Table 3 e Results main analyses.
Hypothesis Bayes factor Posterior Probability Estimated Coefficient
H5: Religiosity [ e Stroop performance (accuracy) Y .022 ð44:82Þ .012  :08 ½  :25; :09
H6: Religiosity [ e Stroop response times [ 105ð25461Þ .000 :01 ½  :01; :02
H7: Religiosity [ e ACC activity (response conflict) Y .286 ð3:49Þ .172  :09 ½  :44; :26
H8: Religiosity [ e ACC activity (informational conflict) Y .046 ð21:87Þ .064 :03 ½  :09; :15
Note. Bayes factors are the order-restricted Bayes factors for the alternative hypothesis of interest; BF0 for H5, H7, and H8 and BFþ0 for H6.
Evidence for the null hypothesis is given between brackets. Posterior probabilities are the posterior model probabilities of the alternative model
versus the null model. Coefficients are themedians of the posterior distributions for the parameter of interest (i.e., religiosity) with 95% credible
intervals in square brackets.
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dependent variable. Again, we expected ACC activity to be
negatively related to religiosity, while taking into account the
effects of gender, age, and intelligence.
A Bayes factor of .046 (BF0 ¼ 0:046, BF0 ¼ 21:9) was ob-
tained, indicating that the data provide strong evidence
against the hypothesis that religiosity is related to reduced
ACC sensitivity to informational conflict in the Stroop task
(i.e., the ‘incongruentecongruent’ contrast). The posterior
median and credible interval for the religiosity predictor were
0:03 ½  0:09; 0:15. The scatterplot in Fig. 5b illustrates the
(absence of an) association between religiosity and sensitivity
of the ACC to informational conflict.
3.3. Exploratory whole-brain analyses
In addition to the confirmatory ROI analyses, we conducted an
exploratory (non-parametric) whole-brain analysis of the ef-
fect of religiosity on both response conflict and informational
conflict. In addition, we ran an ‘intercept-only’ model (esti-
mating the average effect of response and informational
conflict) as an outcome neutral test. All whole-brain t-valueFig. 5 e The relation between religiosity on the BOLD signal con
(left panel) and on the BOLD signal contrast for incongruent vs.
display raw individual data points and Bayesian estimated linea
with 95% credible interval bands.maps and associated ‘1-p-value’ maps can be viewed at and
downloaded from Neurovault (https://identifiers.org/
neurovault.collection:6139).
3.3.1. Outcome neutral tests
In Fig. 6, we visualized the whole-brain results (as t-values) of
the ‘intercept-only’ model for both the response conflict data
(i.e., using the ‘incorrectecorrect’ contrast; Fig. 6A) and the
informational conflict data (i.e., using the ‘incon-
gruentecongruent’ contrast; Fig. 6B).
Both whole-brain maps show widespread effects in areas
known to be involved in error monitoring and cognitive
conflict (such as the ACC and insula). Note that the effects
(i.e., t-values) are much larger in the response conflict
analysis, presumably due to the relatively high variance in
the first-level analysis stage due to high predictor
correlation.
3.3.2. Neural processing and religiosity e response conflict
After multiple comparison correction, no voxels were signifi-
cantly associated with religiosity in the response conflict
analysis.trast for incorrect vs. correct responses on the Stroop task
congruent trials in the Stroop task (right panel). The plots
r effect of religiosity on the conflict-induced BOLD contrasts
Fig. 6 e Brain maps with t-values corresponding to the
outcome neutral (‘intercept-only’) test for both the (A)
response conflict analysis and (B) informational conflict
analysis. The brain maps were masked using P-values
computed using FSL's randomize with threshold-free
cluster enhancement, which we thresholded at p< :05.
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conflict
Similar to the response conflict analysis, no voxels were
significantly associated with religiosity after multiple com-
parison correction in the informational conflict analysis.4. Discussion
In the current preregistered study we investigated whether
religiosity is associated with a reduced sensitivity to cognitive
conflict as measured through behavioral performance on the
Stroop task and neural activation in the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). The data from the outcome neutral tests pro-
vided strong evidence that the gender-Stroop task induced
cognitive conflict at the behavioral level (H1 and H2) and that
this was reflected in increased ACC activity. The neuro-
imaging data showed that the ACC was responsive to both
response conflict (incorrect vs. correct responses; H3) and
informational conflict (incongruent vs. congruent trials; H4).
However, individual differences in religiosity were not related
to performance on the Stroop task as measured in accuracy
(H5) and response times (H6). We also did not observe the
hypothesized relation between religiosity and neural activa-
tion related to response conflict (H7) or informational conflict
(H8). Overall, we obtained moderate to strong evidence in
favor of the null hypotheses according to which religiosity is
unrelated to sensitivity to cognitive conflict. Exploratory
whole-brain analyses similarly showed that conflict-induced
neural activity was not associated with religiosity.These results cast doubt on the theoretical claim that
religiosity is related to a reduced process of conflict sensitivity.
Although this idea is central to various theories about reli-
gious beliefs (e.g., Inzlicht& Tullett, 2010; Schjoedt et al., 2013;
van Elk & Aleman, 2017), our study shows that religious be-
lievers may not be characterized by a general tendency of
attenuated conflict sensitivity. An important motivation for
conducting the current study was to address and overcome
the limitations of previous studies in the field. We did so by
increasing statistical power (i.e., we used a large sample) and
by minimizing degrees of freedom (i.e., we preregistered all
hypotheses, methods, and analyses and a priori specified a
region of interest (ROI) for the fMRI analysis). Moreover, we
curtailed the possibility of (unconscious) biases, as we sepa-
rated the preprocessing of the fMRI data from the statistical
analysis and only combined the fMRI data with the critical
variable of interest (i.e., religiosity) in the final analysis steps.
It is important to note that our sample consisted largely of
highly secular students; the average religiosity score was 1.74
on a 5-point scale and only 43% considered themselves at least
somewhat religious. It could be that the number of religious
believers in the sample was simply insufficient to detect an
effect. Although this is a serious limitation that nuances the
conclusiveness of the current findings, we still believe our
study contributes to the existing literature. The fact that the
Bayesian analyses showed evidence of absence rather than
absence of evidence for the effect, strengthens our belief that
previous claims about the association between religiosity and
cognitive conflict sensitivity should be interpreted with
caution.
Our null findings are perhaps not surprising in light of the
recently voiced concerns about the replicability and reliability
of neuroscientific findings, often related to problems of
insufficiently powered studies (Button et al., 2013; Cremers,
Wager, & Yarkoni, 2017; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017) and general
challenges in studying individual differences using neuro-
imaging (Dubois & Adolphs, 2016). For instance, Boekel et al.
(2015) attempted to replicate 17 findings relating behavior to
brain structures and found convincing evidence for only one
out of the 17 included effects. Similarly, van Elk and Snoek
(2020) recently failed to find support for the hypothesized
relation between religiosity and greymatter volume in several
brain areas that were identified in the literature as being
associated with religiosity.
The current study employed the face-gender word variant
of the Stroop task rather than the classical color-word Stroop
task that has mostly been used in research on religiosity and
cognitive conflict sensitivity. Both tasks rely on inhibition of
the automatic reading process in order to name the semantic
category, with the key distinction that competition takes
place either between different features of the same item (i.e.,
the meaning and the printed color of the word) or between
two different items (i.e., the meaning of the word and the
‘meaning’ of the picture), though also presented within the
same visual field. Theoretically, we see no reason to assume
that this small difference should be consequential for the
religiosityeconflict sensitivity relation; previous claims are
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exclusively for conflicting features within the same item (as
in the color-Stroop task) or in superimposed items (as in the
gender-Stroop task). Furthermore, based on the close simi-
larities between the neurocognitive effects associated with
both tasks, the picture-word and the color-word Stroop task
are often assumed to reflect the same underlying process
(e.g., MacLeod, 1991; Starreveld & La Heij, 2017; van Maanen,
van Rijn, & Borst, 2009, but see; Dell’Acqua, Job, Peressotti, &
Pascali, 2007). Finally, the results of our outcome-neutral
tests also provide no indication for substantially different
mechanisms at play relative to the classical Stroop task; we
find interference effects in the same order of magnitude (i.e.,
50.5 ms; Haaf & Rouder, 2019; MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935),
and observe the same implicated brain areas (i.e., the ACC,
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; MacLeod & MacDonald,
2000).
The fact that we did not find behavioral evidence for
impaired nor for enhanced Stroop performance among reli-
gious believers might indicate that religiosity is unrelated to
low-level cognitive control processes. At the same time, the
null finding may also reflect the paradox that highly robust
experimental effects esuch as the Stroop effecte are often
difficult to relate to reliable individual differences, irre-
spective of the specific individual difference construct of
interest (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Rouder et al., 2019).
That is, because these effects are very robust and automatic
(‘‘everybody Stroops’’), the between-subjects variability is by
definition relatively small. For correlational designs, this
‘problem’ of small between-subjects variability is further
complicated by the presence of measurement error. Rouder
et al. (2019) demonstrated that the ratio of true variability
(i.e., true differences between individuals) to trial noise (i.e.,
measurement error) is 1 : 7. This unfavorable ratio renders
the mission to uncover individual differences in cognitive
tasks difficult, if not even impossible. Hierarchical models
could mitigate these problems, as these models minimize
the effect of trial noise by pulling the trial-level estimates
toward the individual's mean effect (known as hierarchical
shrinkage). In the current study, we did apply hierarchical
modeling for the response time models, as well as the neural
ACC models (incorporated in the first-level fMRI models in
FSL and by adding the variance parameter of the beta's in the
statistical models). Nevertheless, as acknowledged by
Rouder et al. (2019), characterizing the degree of measure-
ment error does not imply that the real underlying individual
differences can be recovered. This casts doubt on the feasi-
bility to detect true individual variation in cognitive control
tasks, and hence to uncover associations with other mea-
sures. For example, Hedge et al. (2018) reported correlations
of Stroop performance with other measures of cognitive
control (e.g., Flanker task, Go/No-go task) ranging from  :14
to .14, none of which were significant. If we cannot even
establish correlations between two tasks designed to mea-
sure exactly the same underlying phenomenon (i.e., cognitive
control), the quest for reliable correlations between Stroop
performance and more distant constructs such as religiosity
seems all the more futile.Although we obtained moderate to strong evidence for
all null hypotheses related to religiosity and cognitive con-
flict, the current study does not imply that we should reject
the notion of reduced conflict sensitivity as a defining
characteristic of religious beliefs all together. It could well
be that the relationship between religiosity and conflict
sensitivity is restricted to specific instances or contexts and
hinges strongly on the specific measures and operationali-
zations that are used. For example, in the study by Good
et al. (2015) participants read a sermon about different
qualities of God and then performed a Go/No-Go task with
alcohol-related stimuli for which responses should be
inhibited. As all participants refrained form alcohol con-
sumption in their daily lives based on religious grounds,
errors on the Go/No-Go task were seen as ‘religious’ errors,
exposing participants' ostensible pro-alcohol tendencies.
The results showed that emphasizing the loving and
forgiving nature of God reduced the ERN amplitude in
response to religious errors, while emphasizing divine
punishment did not affect the ERN compared to a control
condition. In other words, it could well be that when par-
ticipants first contemplate on the comforting nature of their
religious beliefs, this may reduce conflict-related ACC ac-
tivity as induced by a task that includes religion-relevant
items and responses. Such a task has much higher ecolog-
ical validity than the Stroop task that we employed in the
current study following the work by Inzlicht et al. (2009).
Similarly, the observed reduction of activity in religious
believers' DLPC and ACC while listening to a charismatic
religious authority (Schjoedt et al., 2011), may specifically
depend on the religious content of the speech (and may
disappear when the same religious authority would talk
about public transport or gardening). It is thus important to
do justice to the subjective nature of religious practices and
experiences, when studying these topics. This resonates
with concerns about the lack of ecological validity in many
neuroscience studies on religion (e.g., Schjoedt and van Elk,
in press): while studies such as the present one offer high
experimental control, the measures do not capture the ‘true
stuff’ that most psychologists and neuroscientists of reli-
gion are interested in, namely lived religious beliefs and
experiences.
We see two broad future directions for the field. First, the
development of new and sophisticated techniques in
neuroscience could allow for interesting new hypotheses
and measures. For instance, the use of multi-voxel pattern
analysis (MVPA) may provide insight into the representa-
tional nature of religious concepts endorsed by believers; a
question could be whether the neural representations of
religious agents such as ‘God’, ‘angels’, or ‘Satan’ are more
similar to real people such as ‘Napoleon’ and ‘Donald
Trump’ or to imaginary agents such as ‘Santa Claus’ and
‘Superman’ (cf. Leshinskaya, Contreras, Caramazza, &
Mitchell, 2017).
Novel methods for assessing brain connectivity also
allow for the investigation of new questions (e.g.,
Huntenburg, Bazin, & Margulies, 2018; Margulies et al., 2016)
One could assess for instance the relationship between
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cortical areas and the default mode network (DMN), a
network that is implicated in abstract, high-level thinking. A
hypothesis could be that religious believers are more likely
to show a dissociation between the DMN and primary sen-
sory areas. This could be studied in a correlational resting-
state design, or alternatively, one could assess believers’
brain connectivity while engaging in contemplation of their
(religious) beliefs or actions. For instance, intense personal
prayer may be associated with a decoupling of internal self-
referential processing in the DMN and perceptual process-
ing in the sensory cortices specifically during the prayer
experience, similar to what was found for shamanic trance-
experiences (Hove et al., 2015).
Second, and relatedly, we believe there is much promise
in future endeavours that focus on the application of para-
digms and tasks that have higher ecological validity and
more closely implicate religious concepts, as in the exam-
ples given above. Such an approach can hopefully do more
justice to the multifaceted nature of religious beliefs and
practices and can pave the way for a truly better under-
standing of the mechanisms and processes involved in
religiosity.5. Conclusion
In the current study, we attempted to replicate previous
findings linking religiosity to a reduced sensitivity to con-
flicting information, while mitigating limitations of previous
work. Our results cast doubt on the general claim that reli-
gious believers are characterized by a reduced conflict
sensitivity. That is, in contrast to prior research, our data
provided evidence against an inverse association between
religiosity on the one hand and behavioral performance on
the Stroop task and induced neural activation in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) on the other hand. Although our
findings yield no definitive answer to the question of
whether and how religiosity may be related to (neural
markers of) conflict sensitivity, we believe they highlight that
previous claims should be interpreted with caution and that
the field could benefit frommore ecologically valid measures
to investigate this topic.Funding
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Appendix A. Population Imaging of Psychology
project
The data for this study was collected as part of the Popu-
lation Imaging of Psychology project (PIoP), which was
conducted at the Spinoza Center for Neuroimaging at the
University of Amsterdam. The aim of the PIoP was to offer
researchers the opportunity to collect brain-imaging data
from a large sample of participants (intended N ¼ 250), in
association with their individual difference measure of in-
terest. The data was collected between May 2015 and April
2016.
Standard measurements that were collected for each
participant included a structural T1 MRI scan, task-free
resting state fMRI (6 min), a diffusion tensor imaging (DTI)
scan, and different functional localizer scans that were
collected using EPI sequences, including the Gender Stroop
task, an emotional matching task (Hariri, Bookheimer, &
Mazziotta, 2000), a working memory task (Pessoa,
Gutierrez, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2002), and the antici-
pation of positively vs. negatively valenced stimuli
(Oosterwijk, 2017). In addition, demographic variables were
recorded (gender, age, socio-economic status) for each
participant, as well as two personality questionnaires, the
NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and the SCID (First, Gibbon,
Spitzer, & Benjamin, 1997), and an intelligence test (Raven's
matrices; Raven, 2000). Finally, measures on religiosity and
religious experiences were included (see Methods for de-
tails on the religiosity scale that was used in the present
study).Appendix A.1. Additional Religiosity Items
1. To what extent do you consider yourself to be spiritual?
2. To what extent do you believe in paranormal phenomena
(e.g., astrology or telepathy)?
3. To what extent are your parents religious?
4. To what extent do your parents frequently visit a church or
religious meeting?
5. Do your parents have a religious lifestyle (e.g., don't go
shopping on Sunday, pray before dinner)?Appendix B. . Coefficient Plots
Fig. B.7 e Coefficients of the fixed effects on Stroop accuracy (top left panel), Stroop response times (top right panel),
response conflict ACC activity (bottom left panel), and informational conflict ACC activity (bottom right panel), derived from
the Bayesian regression models. For each predictor, points represent the median estimates, thick lines the 80% credible
interval and thin lines the 95% credible interval. Note that predictors in the accuracy model are on a linear scale and should
be transformed by the inverse logit link to reflect probabilities. In the accuracy and response timemodels, the intercepts are
omitted to enhance visibility of the predictors.
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